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Abstract: Conceptual categories such as the private and public help us make sense of 
the world around us. However, like any categories, be it sociological or critical, social 
taxonomies carry with them a certain risk. They have the potential to mar our 
understanding of social and political reality. In this paper, I would like to rethink some 
features conventionally associated with the public/private distinction. Faithful to the 
paradigm of reflective judgment, which looks at the particular and tries to evaluate how it 
informs universal concepts, my point of departure is the film The Lemon Tree; a film that 
raises questions about the limitations of socially constructed and self-imposed categories, 
and invites the audience to rethink conventional views. I interpret the film relying on 
several conceptual categories that Hannah Arendt developed in the course of her writing: 
the actor/spectator distinction, the labor/work/action categories, and her discussion of 
loneliness. 
Keywords: gender, reflective judgment, autonomy, private/public, Arendt. 
 
MULHERES PRIVADAS, HOMENS PÚBLICOS: JUÍZO REFLEXIVO E AUTONOMIA EM THE 
LEMON TREE 
Resumo: Categorias conceptuais como o privado e o público ajudam-nos a 
compreender o mundo que nos rodeia. No entanto, como quaisquer outras categorias, 
sejam sociológicas ou críticas, as taxonomias sociais acarretam algum risco. Têm a 
capacidade de desfigurar a nossa compreensão da realidade política e social. No 
presente artigo, gostaria de repensar algumas características que convencionalmente se 
associam à distinção público/privado. Fiel ao paradigma do juízo reflexivo, que observa o 
particular e procura avaliar de que modo este configura conceitos universais, o meu 
ponto de partida é o filme The Lemon Tree; um filme que levanta questões sobre as 
limitações de categorias construídas e autoimpostas, convidando a audiência a repensar 
pontos de vista convencionais. Procedo a uma interpretação do filme com base em 
várias categorias conceptuais desenvolvidas por Hannah Arendt no decurso da sua 
escrita: a distinção ator/espetador, as categorias trabalho/obra/ação e a sua discussão 
sobre a solidão. 
Palavras-chave: género, juízo reflexivo, autonomia, privado/público, Arendt. 
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A Human being must be able to pull himself together to 
form a judgment otherwise he turns into what we Viennese 
call a guten Potschen [doormat] 
(Freud, 1961: 74) 
 
You see, I know that it’s difficult to think well about 
‘certainty’, ‘probability’, ‘perception’, etc. But it is, if 
possible, still more difficult to think, or try to think, really 
honestly about your life and other people’s lives. And the 
trouble is that thinking about these things is not thrilling, 
but often downright nasty. And when it’s nasty then it’s 
most important. 
(Wittgenstein in Norman, 1962: 35) 
 
 
The distinction between the private and the public has been central to feminist theory 
and critique. As Carole Pateman noted, 
 
the dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two 
centuries of feminist writing and political struggle; it is ultimately what the feminist 
movement is about. (Pateman, 1983: 281)1  
 
Conceptual categories such as the private/public help us make sense of the world 
around us. They enable us to function efficiently and make quick judgments as social 
agents. They also importantly–and this has been the task taken up by feminist theory–
need to be problematized and turned into objects of critical reflection. But like any 
categories, be it sociological or critical, social taxonomies carry a certain risk. They 
have the potential to mar our understanding of social and political reality by acting as 
easy shortcuts that obviate the need to think independently and form autonomous 
judgments. The authority of conceptual categories, often masked as truths, can 
potentially be countered by reflective judgment.   
In this paper, I would like to rethink some features conventionally associated with 
the public/private distinction. Faithful to the paradigm of reflective judgment, which 
looks at the particular and tries to evaluate how it informs universal concepts, my point 
of departure is the film The Lemon Tree; a film that raises questions about the 
limitations of socially constructed and self-imposed categories, and invites the 
audience to rethink conventional views.  
In order to do so, I interpret the film relying on several conceptual categories that 
Hannah Arendt developed in the course of her writing. It might appear strange, if not 
                                               
1
 Similarly Susan Okin argued: “The private is public”; “The personal is political is the central message of 
the feminist critiques of the public/domestic dichotomy” (Okin, 1989: 124). There is a vast literature on the 
subject. See Mackinnon, 1989; Elshtain, 1981; Gavison, 1992; Scott and Keats, 2006. 
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downright non-sensical to rely on Arendt’s theory for critical exploration of gender 
issues in general and feminist theory in particular. To be sure, Arendt was not a 
feminist thinker, and there are very few references in her opus of writing that pertain 
explicitly to “the woman question”. And yet, I would argue that some of the theoretical 
notions she developed are disclosive in that they help to reveal certain elements of 
women’s experiences that are otherwise swept too easily under existing distinctions.  
More specifically, I would like to reconsider the experience of the women and men 
in The Lemon Tree along three themes that Arendt developed: the actor/spectator 
distinction, the labor/work/action categories, and her discussion of loneliness. As a 
work of art, The Lemon Tree offers us the opportunity to consider the practice of 
judgment on several levels: at the level of the film plot, some characters (but not all) 
engage in reflective judgment and think, as Wittgenstein noted ‘really honestly about 
their life’ with life-transforming consequences. On a second level, we the audience are 
invited to question conventional social categories. 
I begin this paper by outlining the basic plot of the film, and the ways its main 
characters appear at first sight to conform to conventional gender stereotypes. I then 
move to outline briefly the basic idea of reflective judgment and Arendt’s particular take 
on it. I then develop briefly three conceptual dimensions of her thought, which I think 
are useful for illuminating the plot of the film. 
 
1. THE PLOT OF THE FILM 
Before outlining the plot of the Lemon Tree I would like to say a few words about the 
very notion of subjecting a film to critical analysis. Films are texts; they weave 
narratives and invite us the audience to form judgment. They provide “unique insight 
into our understanding of the relationship between law, society and culture.” (Kamir, 
2000a: 39). As Kamir goes on to explain: 
 
Films go beyond contributing cinematic-theoretical input and conduct their own 
cinematic socio-cultural “judging acts”. Engaging in socio cultural dialogue with 
legal discourse, a film’s underlying structure may evoke its viewer’s unconscious, 
intuitive familiarity with legal notions and conventions, and, relying on “legal 
intuition” thus evoked, the film may manipulate it and engage the viewer in its 
own implicit judging process. Such cinematic proceedings are distinct from 
fictional legal proceedings portrayed on-screen. Judgment by film may use a 
film’s characters, plot, imagery and structure to represent more general social 
issues and may result in very real influence on the world-view of audiences, who 
are also society’s jurors, judges and “reasonable people”. In the “law and film” 
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relationship, film may therefore play far more active theoretical as well as “socio-
cultural judging” roles than portraying legal issues and courtroom drama, or 
supplying plots for legal analysis. This cinematic activism may go unnoticed and 
thus escape awareness. (2000a: 40)2 
 
It is precisely this socio-cultural “judging act” that The Lemon Tree invites us to 
participate in that I wish to make explicit.  
The film The Lemon Tree (directed by the Israeli director Eran Riklis, 2009) is a 
parable; it contains a limited number of characters and events. The catalyst of the 
story, a lemon grove – unlike the olive tree, with its deep cultural, religious and 
emotional resonance – serves as a blank canvas against which the internal emotional, 
political and legal machinations become crystalized. Parables are meant to distill 
essential elements for didactic purposes. The Lemon Tree tells a simple story, but in 
the course of the story it also thematizes and problematizes commonly used binary 
social distinctions.  
Salma Zidane (played by Hiam Abbass), a Palestinian widower, lives in the West 
Bank in a small, dilapidated house. Salma’s children are grown up and live on their 
own. She is lonely, with only the stern gaze of her deceased husband looking out from 
a photo to keep her company at home. Her lifeworld is circumscribed to her small 
house and the lemon tree grove that envelops the house. Her daily social interaction is 
largely limited to the elderly farmer who helps her tend to the grove.  
Salma’s house and grove are situated right next to the border with Israel. One day 
the Israeli defense minister, Israel Navon and his wife Mira (played by Rona Lipaz-
Michael), move into a nice villa on the other side of the border. The Israeli security 
services are worried that terrorists might use the lemon grove as a hiding place from 
which to launch an attack on the minister’s house. Within days Salma is informed that 
her grove is to be cut down as a precautionary measure. 
Salma decides to leave the familiar safe confines of her circumscribed life and 
appeals the decision in a local military court. The grove is an essential part of her 
identity; she has inherited it from her father. It represents for her the very point of her 
life, in the absence of meaningful existence in the present and future (she has no 
husband or children to tend to). To represent her in the legal battle, Salma enlists the 
help of an attorney who petitions the decision on her behalf. The local military court 
decides against Salma’s petition, and so she resolves to appeal the local military 
                                               
2
 There is substantial literature on the subject of films as text, and more particularly films as object of socio-
legal analysis. See for example Denvier, 1996; Hollinger, 1998; Kamir 2005; Kamir, 2000b; Machura and 
Robson, 2001, and Sarat and Kearns,1999. 
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commander’s decision to the Israeli Supreme Court in Jerusalem. In the interim a love 
affair develops between the widowed middle-aged Salma and the single, younger 
attorney.  
On the other side of the fence, Mira mirrors Salma’s existence, albeit in much more 
refined and modernized circumstances. She is a professional modern woman (possibly 
an interior designer), with a wide set of acquaintances and commitments. As the wife of 
an important cabinet minister she is in charge of domestic and entertaining functions. 
Like Salma, Mira also strikes us as lonely; her (adopted) daughter is away at university 
and her husband is absent physically and emotionally.  
Although they literally live next to each other, Mira and Salma rarely meet in 
person. There is the physical fence that separates them. In obvious and superficial 
ways Mira and Salma are worlds apart. Salma is a nobody; a middle-aged widower 
living in poverty in a traditional society where codes of honor have powerful presence, 
guiding her behavior and acceptance by her community. She has no reason to expect 
the possibility of new beginnings in her future. The way she lives, one might say exists, 
is unlikely to change now that she has been discharged from her duties as wife and 
mother. The only place where she can still leave a mark on the world is her lemon 
grove. Mira on the other hand is a modern self-assured, accomplished, educated, 
articulate and stylish woman. She has a career, a circle of friends, life’s comforts and 
social recognition. And yet she too strikes us as lonely, cloistered in her house, 
surrounded by her constantly vigilant bodyguards.  
Mira and Salma occasionally peer at each other curiously from over the fence, 
which grows taller and wider as time goes by (the film is set around the time when the 
dividing wall was being built by the Israeli government). Mira feels the injustice involved 
in the arbitrary decision to cut down Salma’s lemon grove but chooses initially to side 
with her husband, and remains silent on the matter. Increasingly indignant about the 
way in which Salma is being treated, Mira discusses her critical views frankly with a 
journalist, who publishes the story in one of Israel’s leading newspapers. Overnight, the 
story becomes a news sensation. Salma’s grove has turned into a cause celebre, a 
modern version of the battle of David v. Goliath, attracting visitors and interest from all 
over the world. Salma is the Palestinian woman who has taken the Israeli Defense 
Minister to court. The case has become a test case. It has become exemplary. 
The Israeli Supreme Court - sitting as a high Court of Justice - hears Salma’s case; 
it brings down a verdict based on proportionality. The lemon grove is to be cut down 
but only half way down the tree, so as not to conceal potential terrorists. The decision 
legally constitutes a precedent. Ziad the lawyer frames it in front of the media as a 
victory for the Palestinian people. But for Salma, this decision misses the point. Her 
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battle was for recognition, not merely for the preservation of her private property. Still, 
Mira has seen her, in the profound sense that Mira understands Salma, her reason, 
courage and the justice of her claim. In the aftermath of this unsatisfying judicial 
resolution, the ties that sustained the personal relations between the main characters 
dissolve. Salma, who ignored the stern warning from the head of her village that the 
impropriety of the romantic liaison with the attorney must end, remains alone. The 
young attorney, who clearly harbors true feelings for Salma, marries the daughter of a 
powerful man. Mira leaves her husband, and the minister is left alone staring at a huge 
concrete wall that now separates between his house and the half-cut lemon tree grove. 
The dividing wall has brought him security but no internal understanding and no 
political resolution. 
 
2. COMMON CONCEPTIONS 
In order to uncover the subtle underlying, even subversive, elements that lie in the act 
of judgment, let me lay out the way in which the film and its gender representations 
appear at first blush to align with conventional classification of gender identities. Most 
saliently, the private/public distinction appears to offer a usefully conceptual tool for 
making sense of the characters.  
The two female characters, Salma and Mira, fulfill classic feminine roles; they are 
first and foremost wives. Salma, although strictly speaking a widow, is a wife even 10 
years after her husband has passed away for he is a constant presence in her life; her 
honor is still tied to his memory as the head of her village reminds her (Bourdieu, 
1986). Mira, although a professional woman, is primarily the wife of an important 
cabinet minister. She dutifully preforms the various activities and engagements 
expected of a woman in her station: she decorates her new home tastefully, hosts 
gatherings for military wives, and plans celebrations in honor of her important husband. 
Salma and Mira are devoted mothers to grown-up children who have fled the nest and 
have their own families and preoccupations. Mira is incomplete in that respect. She had 
a miscarriage and her single child is adopted. Mira confesses she had wanted to adopt 
more children but her husband refused. 
On the other side of the divide, the two male characters are paragons of male 
public activity. Israel Navon is a self-assured man who knows himself to be important. 
His business is the business of keeping a country safe. He is also a witty and shrewd 
politician, trying to curry favour with various members of his political alliance. Ziad, the 
Palestinian lawyer, is a man in the making. He has completed his legal education in 
Russia, where he had a daughter out of wedlock with a local woman (as a man, the 
rules of honor and sexual propriety do not apply to him as they do to Salma). Salma’s 
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legal battle turns out to be a career defining moment for him. Emotionally, he hasn’t 
been hardened yet; he is genuinely touched by her courage and beauty. But by the end 
of the film he does what he is expected to do; he marries advantageously to promote 
himself.  
The two men are interested in power, the women in self-fulfillment within their 
homes. The domestic (the lemon grove, Mira’s pottering around her big, stylish but 
empty house) are clearly juxtaposed to the high politics that is the purview of the men. 
In a poignant scene Salma ventures gingerly into a men’s club. She has come seeking 
help from the head of her village to translate a letter from the Israeli occupying forces. 
The letter informs her that due to the immediate and present danger posed by the 
lemon grove to the Defense Minister’s house, the grove will be cut down with 
immediate effect. She is visibly crestfallen, but even at this moment she is not taken 
seriously; aware of her visible distress, the head of the village is reproachful and 
reminds her of the real hardship that the Palestinian people have to endure. Her 
problem, he implies, is trifle in comparison. Even her son fails to understand the depth 
of her distress. It is just an old lemon grove, “not worth the effort since dad died”. 
One could say that the four characters are almost clichés in that they represent so 
clearly and, it appears unambiguously, what in feminist theory has come to be 
identified as the public/private dichotomy.  
 
3. REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT IN THE THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 
Before subjecting the categories of private and public as they apply to gender roles in 
The Lemon Tree to reflective judgment, it would be useful to explain briefly what 
reflective judgment is. The idea of reflective judgment was first articulated and defined 
by Immanuel Kant in the Third Critique. In contradistinction to determinate judgment, 
where a principle exist a  priori and is applied to a given case like an algorithm, in 
reflective judgment we first encounter the particular and try to determine under which 
principle or universal it falls (Kant, 2000; Arendt, 1982; Beiner, 1983; Ferrara, 1999 and 
2008). 
Kant himself did not believe that the practice of reflective judgment applies to 
politics (or legality, as he called it). In his view, legality was subject to determinate 
judgment. In her Lectures on Kant, Arendt developed the notion of reflective judgment 
as the paradigmatic political practice. As she famously put it, Kant’s Third Critique 
“contains perhaps the greatest and most original aspect of Kant’s political philosophy.” 
(Arendt, 1961: 219). 
The basic premise in the paradigm of reflective judgment is that politics is 
essentially complex and cannot be reduced to easy or clear-cut solutions. Contrary to 
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determinate judgment, principles for determining the right course of political action are 
not given in advance. In contrast to determinant judgment, reflective judgment stresses 
the inescapable need to articulate general principles from particular situations. The 
validity of reflective judgments is determined intersubjectively, by a public (imagined or 
real) that is wooed into agreement through free deliberation, and persuasion (Mihai, 
2013: 209). When we judge, we interpret ourselves, our historical and identities, and 
our social relationships. The validity of reflective judgment depends on inclusiveness; 
on taking into consideration the positions of as many individuals as possible. It is only 
by listening to opinions offered by others, and submitting them to evaluation that 
political action can be exercised. Judgments, it is important to note, are not private 
opinions, nor are they absolute truths. Rather, “it is a mode of thinking which is capable 
of dealing with the particular in its particularity but which nevertheless makes the claim 
to communal validity” (Bernstein, 1986: 239). 
Arendt defined politics as “self-disclosure in the space of appearances” (Beiner, 
1983: 110) where “debate constitutes the very essence of political life” (Arendt,1961: 
241). Like art, politics is the realm of appearance and performance; a shared spectacle 
that elicits the spectators’ judgments (ibidem: 153). For Arendt, “the capacity to judge is 
a specifically political ability insofar as it enables individuals to orient themselves in the 
public realm and to judge the phenomena that are disclosed within it from a standpoint 
that is relatively detached and impartial” (D’Entreves, 2000: 250). “Judging,” Arendt 
wrote, “is the one, if not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-
with-others comes to pass” (1961: 221). 
By engaging our moral sensibilities, and political imagination, exemplary figures 
can help enlarge its perspective: “examples orient us in our appraisal of the meaning of 
the action not as a schemata, but as well-formed works of art do: namely as 
outstanding instances of congruency capable of educating our discernment by way of 
exposing us to selective instances of the feeling of the furtherance of our life.” (Ferrara, 
2008: 61). As a work of art, The Lemon Tree gives us the opportunity to consider the 
potent political notion of reflective judgment. In the next three sections I consider how 
our understanding of the public/private and its relation to gender identity and autonomy 
can be advanced by the practice of reflective judgment.  
 
3.1. ACTOR/SPECTATOR 
Judgment can be both retrospective and prospective. Its temporality can be articulated 
in two different directions. We think of judgment as a culmination of a process (for 
example, a legal process). In this sense it is the final say, verdict on a matter. But 
judgment also has an opposing directionality: judging (for example, moral judgment) is 
Private Women, Public Men: Reflective Judgment and Autonomy in The Lemon Tree  
101 
something we do when we need to determine a course of action, or a practical 
problem. This tension between judgment as retrospective and prospective raises the 
tension between the agent as a spectator and the agent as a participant (Benhabib, 
1988: 31). Arendt was fully aware of the potential tension, 
 
One judges always as a member of a community, guided by one’s community 
sense, one’s sensus communis. But in the last analysis, one is a member of a 
world community by the sheer fact of being human: this is one’s “cosmopolitan 
existence”. When one judges and when one acts in political matters, one is 
supposed to take one’s bearings from the idea, not the actuality, of being a world 
citizen and therefore, also a Weltbetrachter, a world spectator. (Arendt, 1982: 75-
76) 
 
The actor and the spectator are not inherently disconnected, separate roles, 
undertaken by different people. Each person inhabits, or rather, ought to inhabit both 
roles. As judges we are both actors and spectators, taking our cues not only from our 
own political community but also from the regulative idea of a universal humanity. The 
following passage from the Life of the Mind provides further clues to the role of 
humanity as a guide to universal norms: 
 
It is by virtue of this idea of mankind, present in every single man, that men are 
human, and that he can be called civilized or humane to the extent that this idea 
becomes the principle of their actions as well as their judgments. It is at this point 
that the actor and the spectator become united; the maxim of the actor and the 
maxim, the “standard” according to which the spectator judges the spectacle of 
the world become one. (Arendt, 1978: 271) 
 
How can the individual play both roles? It might look something like this: action 
requires a background (hi)story that has shaped contemporary social institutions, 
normative evaluative stances, and political arrangements. One way to escape from the 
sway of these precepts (which are handed down by various means of inculcated public 
memory, indoctrinated symbols, national education and myth building practices) as 
Arendt tells us is by appealing to a universal standard of spectatorship. It is easy to see 
that taking on such a role involves a tall order on the part of the individual. It would 
require, to begin with, recognizing as problematic conventional practices that through 
their repetitive hegemonic status have become transparent. Secondly, the individual 
would need to imagine and identify an alternative point of view from which to criticize 
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these parochial practices. Finally, the individual would find herself at a decisive juncture 
where she would need to decide how to act on her judgment. This may be a particularly 
painful decision when there is a contradiction between the communal practice and the 
universal standpoint.  
In line with our conventional views of private and public as articulated in the 
previous section, the characters of The Lemon Tree present fascinating examples of 
spectators (the women) and actors (the men). In The Lemon Tree the men are actors, 
active agents in the public sphere, dictating their own actions and the ones of their 
subordinate women. (Even Salma’s dead husband contrives to police her behavior 
from beyond the grave: figuratively through his photograph that looks on her 
continuously and literally through the codes of honor and propriety she is held to as his 
widow). The women appear initially to be passive spectators. Literally, Mira and Salma 
observe each other and the unfolding of the events. The active men, particularly Israel 
Navon the defense minister, are so busy enacting their gendered prescribed roles that 
they neglect to observe and see the human tragedy that unfolds quite literally in front of 
him. It is the watchful Salma and Mira, initially portrayed as silent figures (both 
characters saying very little and always somewhat tentatively), that display inner 
courage and find a balance between their role as spectator and their moral duty as 
actors, through the medium of judgment.  
Making the move from spectator to actor is by no means a trivial shift. Finding a 
balance between spectator and actor requires, as Arendt implied, a painful and 
sometimes tragic choice. Both Salma and Mira refuse to conform to the script provided 
to them by their community in general and the men in their lives in particular. Salma 
decides to open a legal battle to save her grove, which is the source of her identity. 
She is fighting for recognition as a valued human being, and in so doing goes entirely 
against the expectations of her community. Mira insists on the right to have her own 
voice. She chooses to express her solidarity and commitment to justice, even though 
her public endorsement of Salma’s fight directly undermines her husband and the 
defensive-alarmist stance of the security forces. Salma and Mira choose consciously to 
“go public”. They have quite literally left the confines of their private lives where they 
were silent passive spectators and chose to act.  
The men on the other hand, are so engrossed in their actions, that they have no 
time for reflection, imagination and recognizing the existence of alternative points of 
view. The film is peppered with references to this form of thoughtlessness. In one 
scene Mira tells her husband that since he is the Defense minister it is within his power 
to revoke the order to cut down the grove. His reply is bureaucratic; she cannot really 
expect him to go against the advice of the secret service. Mira’s reply is important: 
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“there must be another solution.” She, unlike him, is trying to imagine a different reality. 
Israel’s reply is equally telling; “for the past three thousand years we’ve been seeking a 
different solution”. Resigned, Mira replies, “do what you think is right. Just continue to 
avoid reality as you always do”. In another scene Navon speaks to a reporter. He 
admits that personally he sees no need to cut the trees. He quotes his father as saying: 
“the Jews will be able to sleep safely only when the Palestinians will have hope. But In 
any event” concludes Israel, “the trees must go”.  
In a scene when Mira quietly crosses the fence and is about to knock on Salma’s 
door, she is stopped by one of her bodyguards. He makes clear she is not allowed to 
be there since it is against the rules. Mira asks him if he has ever thought about the 
rules. He replies, “it is not my role to think” Mira replies, “it is a good idea to do so 
occasionally”. 
The ability to observe, which is perhaps more typical of those who are sidelined or 
marginalized from the public sphere and high politics, can then be understood as a 
potential strength of women who habitually inhabit the private sphere. It is their unique 
position that provides them with a better vantage point (Arendt would call it 
disinterestedness) to better recognize recurring patterns of political engagements that 
lead only to iteration and despair, and attempt to imagine alternative possibilities. This 
relationship between spectatorship and action, between private and the public, leads 
me to another central conceptual distinction in Arendt’s though, which has interesting 
interpretive implications for us. 
 
3.2. LABOR, WORK AND ACTION 
In The Human Condition Arendt famously distinguishes between three realms of 
human activity: labor, work and action. Labor is a manual activity that corresponds to 
the biological necessity of human existence. It is never ending, creates nothing of 
permanence, its efforts are quickly consumed and it must be perpetually renewed in 
order to sustain life (Arendt, 1958a: 7, 81). In this respect, humans are closest to the 
animals and so are least human. Because labor is dictated by necessity, the human 
laborer is the equivalent of a slave, in that he is unfree (ibidem, 84).  
Unlike labor, work is “that activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of 
human existence, which is not embedded in, and who mortality is not compensated by, 
the species’ life cycle” (ibidem, 7). Work creates a world that is distinct from nature. 
The human in this mode of activity is a homo faber; he creates walls (physical and 
cultural), which divide the human realm from that of nature and provides a stable 
context (a “common world) of spaces and institutions within which human life can 
unfold (Yar, 2000: 5). Representatives of this activity are the builder, the architect, the 
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artist and the legislator who create the public world. While work is not the activity of 
politics as Arendt defines it, its fabrications are the precondition for the existence of a 
political community.  
Work, while higher in the hierarchy of the vita activa is not freed from necessity, 
because of its instrumental character. Human freedom can only be found, according to 
Arendt in the activity of action. Freedom is not an inner, private phenomenon. Rather, it 
is active, worldly and public. As she puts it: “we first become aware of freedom or its 
opposite in our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves.” (Arendt, 
1961: 148).  
Arendt’s distinctions, presented here in extremely abridged terms, are significant 
because they overlap – albeit imperfectly – with the private/public distinction. 
Obviously, the women in the film are preoccupied with labor, with the tedious and 
unrewarding tasks of tending to the necessities of life. The men in this film on the other 
hand, are exemplars of the homo faber. Poignantly, the most lasting physical legacy of 
work portrayed in the film is the “security wall” that divides between the west bank and 
Israel. It indeed provides for “a stable context of spaces and institutions within which 
life can unfold”, but in this case it is a regressive context. For it creates the physical 
conditions for conflictual antagonistic politics where deliberations and mutual 
understanding become even less likely.  
Who then inhabits the sphere of action in The Lemon Tree? In Arendt’s work and in 
feminist thought, it is men who tend to be the main actors in the public sphere. (Arendt 
presents this as a historical fact of Ancient Greece, while for feminists this is a 
sociological fact, which is the result of power structure and domination). But not in The 
Lemon Tree. Here it is the women who step out from the safe and largely silent 
confines of their private spaces into the public limelight. They both decide 
independently on a course of action that is – from their perspectives – unprecedented, 
completely new and surprising. This relates to Arendt’s idea of beginning, which is 
characteristic of human action (Arendt, 1958a: 177). The human being represents and 
embodies the faculty of beginning, the capacity to initiate, to create a new, to introduce 
novelty (ibidem: 165, 153). As Richard Bernstein put it, 
 
the new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical law and 
their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; 
the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. (Bernstein, 1986: 
145) 
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The unpredictable nature of action, distinguishes it from mere behavior, which is 
habituated, regulated process that is conditioned by causal antecedents, and is 
therefore unfree. Authentic human action has the capacity to initiate a wholly new, 
unanticipated, and unexpected event. Action is premised on publicity and plurality in so 
far that it would be meaningless unless there were others present to see it and give 
meaning to it. We need around us others who are sufficiently like ourselves in order to 
understand us, and to recognize the uniqueness of our identities and our actions (Yar, 
2000: 8).  
Both elements of action as Arendt defined it – initiating a new beginning and taking 
place in a public space where other are present to see it and give meaning to it – are 
present in The Lemon Tree. Talking to her daughter, Mira confesses: “because of 
these silly lemons, my life has changes completely.” What she means to say is that the 
dispute over the lemon grove with the neighbor Salma has been a turning point in her 
life. Not because anything in her life has changed. She could have continued following 
the same behavioral patterns as indeed her husband chooses to do. Rather, it has 
changed her perception of life, because she has realized something she had failed to 
recognize before; publicly, that injustice must be recognized and acted upon, and 
privately that the lonely life she has been trapped in, need not continue. She has 
realized, through the process of reflective judgment, that she is an autonomous 
individual.  
Salma’s internal process is similar; on the external level she has initiated change. 
She took the Israeli defense minister to trial, which was instrumental in establishing a 
legal precedent. But perhaps more importantly, she has set out to gain internal and 
external validation. Upon hearing the unsatisfying judgment of the Supreme Court 
justices, Salma stands up in court and proclaims: “the trees are real; my life is real”. 
She has refused to submit to her traditional society’s script, she has initiated legal 
action, she has gained recognition: both in the superficial sense that her name is now 
known worldwide, and in the more profound sense that she has made profound 
connection with another person who understand her life-as-experienced. For despite 
their differences, Mira is sufficiently similar to understands Salma and recognize her 
humanness, uniqueness and action. The ability to see the other is not trivial, even less 
trivial is the ability to take into account another person’s unique perspective. Although 
Israel knows about Salma as much as Mira, he states several times: “I don’t know her, 
but my wife tells me she is very nice”. He is unable to see Salma himself, instead all he 
has to rely on are constructed elements of identity that he imposes upon her: she is a 
Muslim woman, and consequently potentially dangerous (Afshar, 2005). 
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It is not coincidental that for both women, their respective action has an internal 
and an external aspect. They are inherently linked. The external manifestation of the 
action (going to court, going to the press) serves to underpin the re/discovery of oneself 
as an autonomous being capable of independent judgment.  
This leads me to reflect on a central aspect of Arendt’s notion of action. Arendt 
stresses the importance of speech as the central tenet of action. “Action is the public 
disclosure of the agent in the speech deed” (Bernstein, 1986: 222). This action requires 
a public common space where individuals can encounter one another as members of a 
community. The Lemon Tree creates a space where not all action is undertaken 
through speech. In fact, Both Salma and Mira say very little, particularly to each other. 
Their actions, to use the colloquial phrase, speak louder than words. 
 
3.3. LONELINESS AND SOLIDARITY 
I have mentioned earlier that Arendt is a frustrating feminist thinker.3 Her voluminous 
writing deals specifically with gender. However, her discussion of the phenomenon of 
loneliness, while by no means limited to women, affects many women. In her 
illuminating article, “Arendt’s gender-neutral feminism”, Maslin argues;  
 
The so called “woman problem” occurs most prominently when constant 
engagement in labor and lack of solitude lead to a self-denial in which loneliness 
becomes an ontological condition rather than an intermittent reality, thereby 
precluding the kind of connectedness necessary for political action. (Maslin, 
2013: 586) 
 
As The Lemon Tree reveals however, it is the ability of the women in the story for 
enlarged mentality, for inclusive and reflective judgment that allows them to escape 
loneliness.  
In the Origins of Totalitarianism, isolation is a major theme since it is a precondition 
of totalitarianism. Loneliness is mentioned only in the last chapter. Arendt describes the 
process of transforming solitude into loneliness. Loneliness is at its most profound 
“when all by myself, I am deserted by my own self.” 
 
What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self which can be 
realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and 
                                               
3
 The recent scholarship is divided between those who sought to uncover the theoretical treatment of 
women and an implicit feminism (Cutting-Gray, 1993; Pitkin, 1995; Weissberg, 1997) and those who have 
relied on Arendt in order to challenge feminist perspectives (Dietz, 2002; Elshtain, 1981). 
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trustworthy company of my equals. In this situation, man loses trust in himself as 
the partner of his thoughts and that elementary confidence in the world which is 
necessary to make experiences at all. Self and world, capacity for thought and 
experience are lost at the same time. (Arendt, 1958b: 477) 
 
Importantly, “engaging only with others who are “like me literally” ensures a hollow 
existence since it renders thinking and understanding virtual impossibilities.” (Maslin, 
2013: 595). Thinking is an iterative experience of recalling experiences and making 
sense of them. Understanding derives from the process of reflecting on one’s 
experiences in conjunction with a partner (either one’s inner self or another individual) 
and placing them in a larger context. Consequently, in a state of loneliness individuals 
not only experience a profound sense of despair and hollowness, but they also become 
ineffectual politically. Lonely individuals lose the ability to think, derive understanding 
from their experiences and therefore, to judge (ibidem). 
Women face social pressure to find in marriage and motherhood complete 
satisfaction, which is often at odds with their lived experience. Women, struggle to 
attain humanness. “Women must renounce either social equality or economic 
independence; they must accept either enslavement in their own home or the 
dissolution of their families; women must either be constrained by biologically grounded 
tasks or renounce reproduction and family life. This denial of lived experiences is often 
accompanied by an escape into the private realm.” (ibidem: 596). 
It is in the process of sharing thoughts with others that one not only enters into the 
realm of action, but achieves the distinction of being fully human. Since for Arendt it is 
the activity of being seen and heard by others that validates one’s existence, this 
interaction serves as a tether of sorts between the individual and the world (ibidem: 
597). 
Labor and work are solitary activities (even if they take place next to many other 
people), but action is by nature plural and public. Action requires audience since action 
necessarily takes place in the space between (Arendt, 1958a: 182). Action can propel 
one out of loneliness since it is only in action that a person discloses her or his “who” 
nature: it is only in action that we come to know ourselves and are able to let ourselves 
to be known to others (Markus, 1987: 121).  
Maslin’s argument is suggestive and thought provoking. However, it is instructive to 
entertain the possibility that Arendt’s “gender-neutral feminism” in fact, reveals a 
phenomenology of loneliness and therefore thoughtlessness that is more typical of 
men, who are by and large, less confined to the sphere of labor.  
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON GENDER, JUDGMENT AND AUTONOMY 
To judge is to avoid, as Freud put it poetically, becoming a doormat. Arendt thought 
that judgment allows persons to reclaim their human dignity (Arendt, 1978: 216). 
Though the female characters in The Lemon Tree are physically confined to their 
houses they nevertheless manage to tap into enlarged mentality, or what Kant and 
Arendt called sensus communis. Tellingly, both of the women reach greater autonomy 
than the powerful men in their lives. Ziad finds himself in what we understand to be a 
loveless marriage to a daughter of a Palestinian politician, while Israel the defense 
minister is left lonely staring at a concrete wall that surrounds the beautiful house his 
wife has designed. Both are in effect imprisoned, by their own in/actions, by their failure 
to think outside the boundaries of their gendered prescribed roles for pursuing power 
and control. Paradoxically, this very pursuit results in loss of control and autonomy.  
The feminist critique has focused, rightly, on the normative debilitating implications 
the private/public distinction holds for women. But it is possible, and The Lemon Tree 
certainly invites us to entertain the possibility that this conceptual and empirical 
distinction is also harming to men. The film cleverly reverses familiar gender roles: 
those who engage in high politics (at the level of the village or the level of the state) do 
not act. Rather, they enact previously established pathologies. Those who act in this 
film, those who exercise their capacity for reflective judgment, searching for a universal 
perspective, for revisiting their constructed and imposed roles are the “private” women. 
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